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Note
Connecticut’s Food Waste Problem: 
Innovation, Anaerobic Digestion, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause
KARA A. ZARCHIN 
Connecticut has a food waste problem. Much of its food waste ends up 
in landfills where it rots and produces methane gas that contributes to 
global warming. This Note examines Connecticut’s efforts to address its 
food waste problem through a waste flow control law, Public Act 13-285.
With this law, Connecticut became the first state to pass legislation to 
reduce food waste through state-mandated diversion. This Note frames its 
discussion of Public Act 13-285 in terms of federal initiatives to cut food 
waste and the growing national consensus on the important role for 
anaerobic digestion in reducing food waste. This Note argues that in the 
absence of a national food waste recycling ban, Public Act 13-285 
provides an innovative solution that both reduces food waste and promotes 
Connecticut’s anaerobic digestion industry. Connecticut’s law, however, 
may be vulnerable to challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
which protects the belief that one state in its dealings with another may not 
place itself in a position of economic isolation. This Note further argues 
that the Dormant Commerce Clause should show deference to state 
experimentation on the issue of food waste reduction given the role states 
play as innovators and guardians of the environment.
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Connecticut’s Food Waste Problem: 
Innovation, Anaerobic Digestion, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause
KARA A. ZARCHIN *
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, 30 to 40 percent of the post-harvest food supply is 
wasted every year.1 This is $218 billion worth of food that is pitched in the 
garbage.2 If this food waste3 were grown in one place, “this mega-farm 
would cover roughly 80 million acres, over three-quarters of the state of 
California.”4 Globally, “[o]ne-third of the food produced for human 
consumption is lost or wasted . . . which amounts to about 1.3 billion tons 
                                                                                                                         
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., 2018; Bread Loaf School of English, M.A., 
2013; Middlebury College, B.A., in English and History 2006. I would like to thank my family, 
especially my husband, Rob Madden, and children, Conor and Laurel Madden, for their continual 
support and love and my parents for their encouragement and guidance, always. Special thanks to 
Michael Rondon for his friendship and editing advice; Professor Mathilde Cohen for reading an earlier 
draft of this Note; Professor Loftus Becker for his insight on the writing process; and my colleagues on 
the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful feedback and excellent company.
1 Jon Frandsen, Here’s How States Are Working to Curb Food Waste, PBS (May 16, 2017, 1:49 
PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/heres-states-working-curb-food-waste [https://perma.cc/ 
7JE6-AXMQ]; see also Adam Chandler, Why Americans Lead the World in Food Waste, THE
ATLANTIC (July 15, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/american-food-
waste/491513/ [https://perma.cc/H2PM-4XJU] (“[R]oughly 50 percent of all produce in the United 
States is thrown away—some 60 million tons (or $160 billion) worth of produce annually, an amount 
constituting ‘one third of all foodstuffs.’”).
2 Fighting Food Waste with Food Rescue, FEEDING AM., http://www.feedingamerica.org/our-
work/our-approach/reduce-food-waste.html [https://perma.cc/JQU8-7QX8] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018); 
see Chandler, supra note 1 (“For an American family of four, the average value of discarded produce is 
nearly $1,600 annually.”).
3 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations defines food waste as food wasted 
in any part of the food supply chain of “edible products going to human consumption.” FOOD & AGRIC.
ORG. OF THE U.N., GLOBAL FOOD LOSSES AND FOOD WASTE 2 (2011), 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/mb060e/mb060e.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYV7-9CB5]. But see Roni A. 
Neff et al., Wasted Food: U.S. Consumers’ Reported Awareness, Attitudes, and Behaviors, PLOS ONE 
10(6): e0127881 2 (2015), http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0127881 [https://perma.cc/6TZ8-
WUMU] (arguing, instead, for the use of the expression “wasted food” because “it emphasiz[es] that 
the item is essentially food rather than essentially waste”).
4 See REFED, A ROADMAP TO REDUCE U.S. FOOD WASTE BY 20 PERCENT 10 (2016), 
http://www.refed.com/downloads/ReFED_Report_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT5D-UXJV] 
(“Growing the food on this wasteful farm would consume all the water used in California, Texas, and 
Ohio combined.”).
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per year.”5 At every stage of the supply chain, food waste squanders 
resources, including water, land, energy, and labor.6
Food waste is the single largest component of American landfills.7
This rotting food creates so much methane gas that landfills are the third-
largest source of methane in the United States.8 Methane is twenty-five
times more harmful to the atmosphere than carbon dioxide.9 In response to 
the severe impact of food waste on climate change, the United Nations 
announced that “[t]he vast amount of food going to landfills makes a 
significant contribution to global warming.”10
Connecticut has more food waste in its Municipal Solid Waste 
(MSW)11 stream than the national average.12 In 2010, Connecticut’s 
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP) published an 
inaugural statewide waste characterization study that captured random 
samples of waste from residential and industrial/commercial/institutional 
                                                                                                                         
5 See Food Loss and Food Waste, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/food-
loss-and-food-waste/en/ [https://perma.cc/V62M-CDMJ] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018) (“Food that gets 
spilled or spoilt before it reaches its final product or retail stage is called food loss.”).
6 SAVE FOOD: Global Initiative on Food Loss and Waste Reduction, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF 
THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/save-food/resources/keyfindings/en/ [https://perma.cc/7DCL-L5FH] (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2017); see also Neff et al., supra note 3, at 2 (“Wasted food in North America/Oceania 
also accounts for an estimated 35% of freshwater consumption, 31% of cropland, and 30% of fertilizer 
usage; as well as 2% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions; and 21% of post-recycling municipal solid 
waste.” (internal citations omitted)).
7 Chandler, supra note 1.
8 See Landfill Methane Outreach Program (LMOP), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/lmop/basic-information-about-landfill-gas [https://perma.cc/8CMY-NEQA] (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2017) (“Municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills are the third-largest source of human-
related methane emissions in the United States, accounting for approximately 15.4 percent of these 
emissions in 2015.”).
9 Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/
overview-greenhouse-gases#CH4%20referenc [https://perma.cc/UNT3-YETR] (last visited Apr. 22, 
2018) (comparing, pound for pound, the comparative impact of methane to carbon dioxide over a 100-
year period).
10 Id. (emphasis added). Notably, the close link between climate change and resource utilization 
“puts food waste squarely at the center of many global challenges” in addition to climate change. Food 
waste reduction also “would have a game-changing impact on natural resources depletion and 
degradation, food insecurity, [and] national security . . . .” REFED, supra note 4, at 1.
11 Municipal Solid Waste “means solid waste from residential, commercial and industrial sources, 
excluding solid waste consisting of significant quantities of hazardous waste . . . land-clearing debris, 
demolition debris, biomedical waste, sewage sludge and scrap metal . . . .” CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22a-207(24) (2017).
12 Food waste comprises nearly 15 percent of the national MSW stream compared to over 22 
percent of Connecticut’s MSW stream. CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT., 2015 STATEWIDE 
WASTE CHARACTERIZATION STUDY (2016) Figure ES 2-6, http://www.ct.gov/deep/lib/deep/
waste_management_and_disposal/Solid_Waste_Management_Plan/CMMS_Final_2015_MSW_Charac
terization_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LPA-CYZA]; Waste-to-Energy (Municipal Solid Waste), U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm/data/index.cfm?page=
biomass_waste_to_energy [https://perma.cc/XEH7-DTT3] (last visited Dec. 15, 2017). 
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generators across the state.13 In 2015, DEEP replicated this study, 
providing for the first time comparative data of the presence of designated 
recyclables in the state’s disposed MSW.14 Over this five-year period, the 
incidence of food waste in the state nearly doubled from 13.5 to 22.3 
percent—both in tonnage and as a percentage of the MSW stream.15 No 
other recoverable material in the MSW stream increased so precipitously.16
Simply put, Connecticut has a food waste problem.17
There are solutions to food waste. Multiple stakeholders could help 
reduce food waste by changing their behaviors. Indeed, much of the 
nation’s food waste is cultural.18 American consumers’ obsession with the 
aesthetic quality of their food results in the waste of so-called “ugly” fruit 
and vegetables that are rejected because they are bruised or brown.19
Meanwhile, large quantities of fresh produce in the United States are often 
left to rot in fields until, like the “ugly” fruits and vegetables, they too find 
their way into a landfill.20 This Note examines Connecticut’s innovative 
use of an organic waste ban to change the behavior of the state’s 
commercial food wholesalers and distributers, industrial food 
manufacturers and processors, supermarkets, and resorts and conference 
centers. 
Part I frames the central concern of this Note—food waste reduction in 
Connecticut—in terms of federal initiatives to cut food waste. The nation’s 
                                                                                                                         
13 2015 STATEWIDE WASTE CHARACTERIZATION STUDY, supra note 12, at ES-1. 
14 Id.
15 In 2010, there were 321,481 tons of food waste in Connecticut’s MSW stream compared to 
519,832 tons in 2015. Id. at 3-1 to -6; CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT., CONNECTICUT 
STATE-WIDE SOLID WASTE COMPOSITION & CHARACTERIZATION STUDY, FINAL REPORT ES-3 (2010), 
http://www.ct.gov/deep/lib/deep/waste_management_and_disposal/solid_waste/wastecharstudy/ctcomp
ositioncharstudymay2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLB8-GZN2].
16 2015 STATEWIDE WASTE CHARACTERIZATION STUDY, supra note 12, at ES-5.
17 There is no clear reason why Connecticut’s food waste has increased in tonnage. Even 
Connecticut’s 2015 Statewide Waste Characterization Study, supra note 12, which identifies this 
tonnage increase, fails to account for the cause(s) thereof. One contributing factor may be that 
consumers do not internalize the environmental costs of food waste. In 2014, researchers at Johns 
Hopkins conducted the first ever national survey targeted at understanding consumers’ perceptions 
about food waste. Americans report feeling more bothered by letting a faucet drip or leaving the lights 
on than by discarding food. When respondents were asked what would motivate them to reduce food 
discards, “the most important motivation was saving money.” For 22 percent of respondents, 
“environmental concerns of greenhouse gas emissions, energy and water were ‘not at all important’ 
motivations.” Neff et al., supra note 3, at 1, 7; see, e.g., Brian Dowling, House Calls for Food Scraps? 
Meet New Haven’s Biking Compost Man, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 29, 2014, 10:54 AM), 
http://www.courant.com/consumer/hc-ls-compost-bike-new-haven-20141029-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/PTQ2-YYPM] (reporting how Domingo Medina, the founder of the New Haven-
based compost pickup program, Peels & Wheels, believes that Connecticut’s residents do not 
internalize the externalities associated with food waste because, while residents pay taxes for municipal 
trash removal, they “don’t really pay the true costs of food production and food waste”).
18 Chandler, supra note 1.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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food waste problem is readily solvable by Congress if it were so inclined. 
Although the United States has pledged to reduce per capita food waste by 
half by 2030,21 Congress has not provided the necessary funding for the 
infrastructure to process the nation’s food waste. In particular, this Note 
focuses on the growing consensus among key stakeholders that food waste 
reduction requires investment in anaerobic digestion, which converts food 
waste into energy through a process that works much the same way as a 
cow’s stomach.22
Part II discusses how, in the absence of a national food waste recycling 
ban, Connecticut is one of five states that has passed either a waste ban or 
recycling law for food waste.23 Specifically, Connecticut Public Act 
13-28524 is a flow control25 law that mandates the recycling of organic 
materials—which includes food waste—if the business is within twenty
miles of the nearest authorized recycling facility and produces more than 
104 tons of organic materials annually.26 The law’s purpose is twofold: it
both mandates food waste recycling and supports the state’s nascent 
anaerobic-digestion industry.
This Note argues in Part III that Connecticut’s organic waste ban may 
be vulnerable to challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which 
protects the principle that “one state in its dealings with another may not 
place itself in a position of economic isolation.”27 But in the face of 
Congress’ inaction, this Part argues that there should be deference to state 
experimentation on the issue of food waste reduction given the important 
role states play as innovators and guardians of the environment.
                                                                                                                         
21 United States 2030 Food Loss & Waste Reduction Goal, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/united-states-2030-food-loss-and-waste-reduction-
goal [https://perma.cc/VNQ6-KYVF] (last visited Dec. 17, 2017).
22 Mitch Wertlieb & Melody Bodette, Like a Cow’s Stomach Magnified, Methane Digesters Make 
Energy, Reduce Waste, VPR (Jan. 28, 2015), http://digital.vpr.net/post/cows-stomach-magnified-
methane-digesters-make-energy-reduce-waste#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/284Z-ESAQ].
23 Frandsen, supra note 1.
24 Public Act 13-285, 2013 Conn. Acts 254 (Reg. Sess.).
25 See United Haulers Ass’n, v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334 
(2007) (“‘Flow control’ ordinances require trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a particular 
processing facility.”).
26 This minimum tonnage requirement reduces to 52 tons as of January 1, 2020. The law excepts 
those generators “that perform[] composting of source-separated organic materials on site or treat[] 
source-separated organ materials via on-site organic treatment equipment.” CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22a-226e(a)–(b).
27 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
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I. FEDERAL INITIATIVES TO PREVENT AND REDUCE FOOD WASTE
In recent years, there has been a trend to initiate food waste reduction 
goals as a means to end hunger and to address climate change.28 In 
September 2015, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced “the first ever 
domestic goal to reduce food loss and waste by half by the year 2030.”29
Mere days after the announcement, the United Nations adopted a similar 
goal to reduce per capita food waste by half by the year 2030.30
Though an important step, the United States’ food waste reduction goal 
is voluntary. It is an invitation “challenging the country to reduce food 
waste.”31 This Part argues, however, that a mere invitation for action is 
insufficient where federal financial support, such as tax incentives and loan 
funding, is needed for the development of the infrastructure to process food 
waste. This Part argues further that the federal government needs to 
support the development of anaerobic digestion, a food waste diversion 
process that the nation needs to reach its 50 percent diversion goal.
A. Food Recovery Hierarchy Prioritizes Source Reduction Methods
The EPA communicates its prevention and reduction priorities through
its Food Recovery Hierarchy, which essentially promotes a “reduce, reuse, 
and recycle” action plan for food waste.32 The Food Recovery Hierarchy 
serves as a tool guiding public33 and private actions in this field.34
                                                                                                                         
28 See, e.g., Chris Crowley, The United Nations Wants to Cut Food Waste in Half by 2030,
GRUBSTREET (Sept. 25, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.grubstreet.com/2015/09/un-food-waste-goals.html 
[https://perma.cc/A6XP-PBYP] (summarizing a recent resolution passed by the UN General Assembly 
establishing a goal of “cutting per-capita retail and consumer food waste in half by 2030”); About 
Refresh, REFRESH, http://eu-refresh.org/about-refresh [https://perma.cc/C4HX-XCNZ] (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2018) (describing the July 2015 launch of “REFRESH” (“Resource Efficient Food and dRink 
for the Entire Supply cHain”), a research project to combat food waste funded by the European Union 
and supported by twenty-six corporate partners from twelve European countries and China).
29 See United States 2030 Food Loss and Waste Reduction Goal, supra note 21 (“By taking action 
on the U.S. 2030 Food Loss and Waste Reduction goal . . . the United States can help feed the hungry, 
save money for families and businesses and protect the environment.”).
30 Crowley, supra note 28.
31 Allison Aubrey, It’s Time to Get Serious About Reducing Food Waste, Feds Say, NPR (Sept. 
16, 2015, 2:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/09/16/440825159/its-time-to-get-
serious-about-reducing-food-waste-feds-say [https://perma.cc/R4U3-ZM7M] (quoting then-Secretary 
of Agriculture Tom Vilsack).
32 The Food Recovery Hierarchy resembles a reversed six-tiered pyramid with the most preferred 
option at the top and the least preferred (landfill/incineration) at the pyramid’s pointy bottom. 
Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Hierarchy, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/food-recovery-hierarchy [https://perma.cc/3687-
V4CV] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
33 See, e.g., H.R. 3444, 115th Cong. § 503 (requiring that recipients of a loan or grant under § 503 
provide “a written commitment that the recipient has read and agrees to comply with the Food 
Recovery Hierarchy of the Environmental Protection Agency”).
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Specifically, this seven-tiered hierarchy “prioritizes actions [that are] most 
benefi[cial] for the environment, society and the economy.”35 First and 
foremost, the EPA encourages businesses and individuals to prevent waste 
in the first place.36 The next best outcome, according to the EPA, is to 
ensure that surplus food is used to feed the hungry.37 The goal here is to 
divert the 30 to 40 percent of all postharvest food supply that is wasted38 to 
feed the over 12 percent of American households, or roughly 41 million 
people, who are food insecure.39 Congress has long supported the donation 
of food that would otherwise go to waste.40
For the food waste that cannot be eliminated altogether, donated to 
food banks, or used to feed animals,41 the Food Recovery Hierarchy’s 
                                                                                                                         
34 See, e.g., infra Part I.A (discussing how the nonprofit ReFED used the EPA’s Food Recovery 
Hierarchy as a starting point in its data analysis of twenty-seven solutions for the nation’s food waste).
35 Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Hierarchy, supra note 32.
36 The EPA advises that businesses and individuals can achieve source reduction through simple 
managerial decisions like “making grocery lists, inventorying supplies, and buying less.” Additionally, 
waste audits that determine “the amount, type, and reason for the generation of wasted food[] . . . will 
help to create effective wasted food prevention strategies.” Sustainable Management of Food: How to 
Prevent Wasted Food Through Source Reduction, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/how-prevent-wasted-food-through-source-
reduction [https://perma.cc/HM8Q-M5L4] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
37 Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Hierarchy, supra note 32.
38 Frandsen, supra note 1.
39 These numbers are based on data from 2016. Sustainable Management of Food: Reduce Wasted 
Food by Feeding Hungry People, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-
management-food/reduce-wasted-food-feeding-hungry-people [https://perma.cc/MF5X-7LHJ] (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2018); see Matthew P. Rabbitt et al., Understanding the Prevalence, Severity, and 
Distribution of Food Insecurity in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV.
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/september/understanding-the-prevalence-
severity-and-distribution-of-food-insecurity-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/FB4P-YVCN] 
(defining a person as food insecure if “they had difficulty at some time during the year providing 
enough food for all their members because of lack of resources”).
40 See, e.g., Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1791(c) (2012) 
(protecting donors from civil and criminal liability with a floor of gross negligence); The Harvard Food 
Law and Policy Clinic, America Can Finally Give More: Congress Passes Permanent Extension of 
Enhanced Tax Deductions for Food Donations, CTR. FOR HEALTH L. & POL’Y INNOVATION: BLOG
(Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.chlpi.org/america-can-finally-give-more-congress-passes-permanent-
extension-of-enhanced-tax-deductions-for-food-donations/ [https://perma.cc/D5UX-UWPV] 
(describing how, in its 2016 omnibus budget, Congress included a permanent enhanced tax reduction 
for food donations available to all businesses).
41 Notably, both state and federal policies frustrate the third tier of the Food Recovery Hierarchy, 
which promotes the donation of food waste to feed animals. While federal policy generally permits the 
feeding of food scraps to animals, there are rules, such as mandated heating requirements for food 
scraps comprised of animal derived byproducts, that hinder waste recycling to animals. U.S. Food 
Waste Policy Finder: Connecticut Food Waste Policy, REFED, http://www.refed.com/tools/food-
waste-policy-finder/connecticut [https://perma.cc/JQQ7-Q4TS] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). Many states 
either prohibit the feeding of food waste to animals or impose regulations that are far more stringent 
than the floor established by federal law. Kansas and Illinois, for example, prohibit feeding food waste 
to all animals. Id. Sixteen states prohibit feeding animal food waste to swine, and thirteen states 
regulate the feeding of food scraps to other animals beside swine. Id. Connecticut regulates the feeding 
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fourth tier recommends transforming these food scraps into energy through 
anaerobic digestion.42 “Anaerobic digestion is the natural process in which 
microorganisms break down organic materials” in a closed space without 
oxygen.43 This process produces biogas that consists of “mostly methane 
and carbon dioxide.”44 When the carbon dioxide is removed, methane—
“the primary component of natural gas”—remains.45 Unlike the methane 
gas emitted at landfills, this gas can be sold on the natural gas grid.46
Anaerobic digestion’s ability to convert biomass into energy makes it 
the “next big renewable energy source.”47 In this way, anaerobic digestion 
is self-sustaining: it converts a community’s waste into energy that the 
community then uses for electricity.48 “Closing waste loops and recovering 
energy from waste presents a profound opportunity to simultaneously 
improve waste management and address climate change,” according to 
David Babson, a technology manager at the U.S. Department of Energy’s 
Bioenergy Technologies Office.49
There are more than 2000 anaerobic digestion sites in the United 
States, but only 40 to 50 of those sites exclusively process food waste.50 In 
March 2016, ReFED, a data-driven nonprofit committed to reducing food 
waste in the United States,51 used the EPA’s Food Recovery Hierarchy as a 
starting point52 in its analysis of the diversion potential of twenty-seven
                                                                                                                         
of food scraps to swine but does not impose regulations that are more stringent than the floor 
established by federal law. Id.; see Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 22-320a–g.
42 Sustainable Management of Food: Industrial Uses for Wasted Food, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/industrial-uses-wasted-food 
[https://perma.cc/2XEL-XHNB] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
43 Basic Information About Anaerobic Digestion (AD), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/anaerobic-digestion/basic-information-about-anaerobic-digestion-
ad#HowADworks [https://perma.cc/GQ58-JYL7] (last visited Dec. 15, 2017).
44 Id.
45 Anaerobic digestion also produces a nutrient-rich fertilizer called digestate, which is a wet 
mixture that separates from the biogas during the digestion process. Id.
46 See Sheridan Cyr, Quantum Biopower Hits the Grid; Enters Production Phase, SOUTHINGTON 
OBSERVER (Dec. 14, 2017), http://southingtonobserver.com/2017/12/14/quantum-biopower-hits-the-
grid-enters-production-phase/ [https://perma.cc/D3Y2-6E82] (discussing how Quantum Biopower, an
anaerobic digestion facility in Southington, Connecticut, will now be providing energy “to the local 
grid”).
47 Nathan Hurst, Why Anaerobic Digestion Is Becoming the Next Big Renewable Energy Source,
SMITHSONIAN.COM (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/why-anaerobic-
digestion-becoming-next-big-renewable-energy-source-180960992/ [https://perma.cc/G5FV-6SYW].
48 Id. 
49 Id.
50 Centralized Anaerobic Digestion (AD), REFED, http://www.refed.com/solutions/centralized-
anaerobic-digestion [https://perma.cc/8SWB-HPTL] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). 
51 About ReFED, REFED, http://www.refed.com/about [https://perma.cc/PN23-WWX7] (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2018).
52 Food Waste Is a Solvable Problem, REFED, http://www.refed.com/solutions/?sort=diversion-
potential [https://perma.cc/KJ7C-HEKH] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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waste solutions.53 Centralized anaerobic digestion ranked second for 
greatest diversion potential with a 1.9-million ton diversion potential 
annually from landfills and on-farm losses,54 second only to centralized 
composting.55 While its diversion potential is great, anaerobic digestion is 
expensive. Total capital expenditure for a new facility is estimated at $36 
million.56 Although the EPA identifies that “[t]here is increasing interest in 
finding effective means to obtain biofuel and bio-products from wasted
food,”57 federal law does not specially support the infrastructure 
development necessary for the widespread use of anaerobic digestion 
facilities.
B. Federal Agencies Promote Voluntary Programs
In order to reach the nation’s 50 percent reduction goal by 2030, the 
federal government needs to invest in the solutions identified in the EPA’s 
Food Recovery Hierarchy. Instead, the EPA and USDA have placed the 
onus on the public through the creation of two voluntary programs.58
First, the EPA has called on schools and businesses to participate in its 
U.S. Food Loss and Waste Challenge (the Challenge), a voluntary program 
that encourages participants to conduct personal food waste audits, share 
best practices, and attain personal reduction goals.59 In 2016, 950 
participants and endorsers60 “prevented and diverted over 740,000 tons of 
food waste from entering landfills or incinerators.”61 Of that, 85,000 tons 
                                                                                                                         
53 Solutions considered included Date Labeling, Consumer Education Campaigns, Donation 
Storage and Handling, Donation Matching Software, Donation Transportation, Value-Added 
Processing, Donation Liability Education, Safe Donation Regulation, Donation Tax Incentives, Home 
Composting, Community Composting, and Water Resources Recovery Facilities with Anaerobic 
Digestion. REFED, A ROADMAP TO REDUCE U.S. FOOD WASTE BY 20%: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 3, 21 
(March 2016), https://www.refed.com/downloads/ReFED_Technical_Appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KKQ8-TXXT].
54 Id. at 48.
55 Centralized composting has a diversion potential of five million tons annually. Id. at 51.
56 This figure is based on the capital costs for a 40,000-ton anaerobic digestion facility, including 
equipment for the anaerobic digestion, odor control, gas treatment, and internal combustion engines. 
Additionally, it includes costs for engineering and capital costs for composting the digestate. Id. at 53.
57 Sustainable Management of Food: Industrial Uses for Wasted Food, supra note 42.
58 See USDA Food Waste Champions, U.S. DRUG ADMIN., https://www.usda.gov/oce/foodwaste/
Champions/index.htm [https://perma.cc/WQ7R-NX53] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) (“Government alone 
cannot reach this goal. It will require effort and action from the entire food system.”).
59 Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Challenge (FRC), U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/food-recovery-challenge-frc#how 
[https://perma.cc/QYY6-A6MS] (last visited Jan.11, 2018).
60 While participants are involved in the food prevention and reduction that count toward the 
program’s results, endorsers are organizations and businesses that promote food sustainability through 
education. Connecticut’s DEEP, for example, serves as an active endorser of the EPA’s U.S. Food Loss 
and Waste Challenge. Id.
61 Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Challenge Results and Award Winners, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/food-recovery-challenge-
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of food were anaerobically digested.62 Second, in November 2016, the 
USDA and EPA formed the U.S. Food Loss and Waste 2030 Champions, a 
corporate call for action comprised of “businesses and organizations that 
have made a public commitment to reduce food loss and waste in their own 
operations in the United States by 50 percent by the year 2030.”63
The commitment from corporate America rightly places food waste 
prevention and reduction on the national stage.64 The problem, however, is 
that these initiatives alone will not help the United States to reach its 50
percent reduction goal by 2030. A 740,000-ton reduction, while 
commendable, is a far cry from reaching, say, a 30-million ton reduction 
by 2030, which would have been 50 percent of the nation’s total food 
waste in 2016.65 The United States also needs a comprehensive wide-scale 
plan for the reduction of food waste.66
C. Congress Considers “Bipartisan” Issue
In May 2016, the House Committee on Agriculture held its first 
hearing on food waste—an issue that the hearing’s chairman, Republican 
Congressman K. Michael Conaway, declared is bipartisan.67 At this 
hearing, anaerobic digestion emerged as a key solution for food waste 
                                                                                                                         
results-and-award-winners [https://perma.cc/4WQM-3CRJ] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). As of January 
2018, there were 595 active Challenge participants, including 290 food, drug, and convenience stores; 
87 colleges or universities; 85 sports or entertainment venues; 4 government agencies; and 3 local 
governments. Id.
62 Id.
63 USDA Food Waste Champions, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.usda.gov/oce/foodwaste/
Champions/index.htm [https://perma.cc/D4KE-BY7V] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). Notably, there is 
some overlap between participants of the EPA’s Challenge and the EPA and USDA’s Champions, 
including Aramark, Wegmans Food Market, and Yum! Brands. Id.; Sustainable Management of Food: 
Food Recovery Challenge (FRC), supra note 59.
64 Participants include the Boston Red Sox, Big Y Food, Inc., Dana Farber Cancer Institute, 
Denver International Airport, Disneyland Resort, HBO, MGM Resorts International, and Whole Foods 
Market, just to name a few. Id. 
65 See Chandler, supra note 1 (“[R]oughly 50 percent of all produce in the United States is thrown 
away—some 60 million tons (or $160 billion) worth of produce annually, an amount constituting ‘one 
third of all foodstuffs.’”).
66 ReFED, “a collaboration of over 30 business, non-profit, foundation, and government leaders 
committed to reducing food waste in the United States,” noted in its roadmap for food waste reduction 
that “[w]hile some solutions are gaining ground, the United States still lacks a comprehensive action 
plan to unleash a wide-scale national reduction in food waste.” REFED, supra note 4, at 2, 10.
67 Food waste is often met with bipartisan support because it is primarily presented as a way to 
end hunger, something that everyone wants. Food Waste from Field to Table: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Agric., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) [hereinafter Food Waste] (statement of Rep. K. Michael 
Conaway) (“Tackling food waste in this country is, and should be a non-partisan issue that will be most 
successful by engaging everyone in the food chain, from the field to the table.”); see also Arthur 
Delaney, We Waste So Much Food That Congress Might Actually Do Something, HUFFPOST (July 6, 
2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/food-waste-date-labels-chellie-
pingree_us_576a8deee4b0c0252e77c263 [https://perma.cc/G43B-Z47D] (“[R]epublicans and 
Democrats have found something they might be able to agree on: Garbage is bad.”).
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reduction,68 a solution that also helps to reduce methane generation at 
landfills, to create nutrient-filled digestate for the soil, and to produce clean 
energy that can be sold for profit.69 Those who testified in support of 
anaerobic digestion recognized that the lack of widespread infrastructure 
for it in the United States presents a financing hurdle.70 Additionally, for 
anaerobic digestion facilities to be successful, infrastructure options must 
be “geographically and operationally feasible.”71 This is because the cost 
of transporting food waste, which is very wet and dense, to an anaerobic 
digestion facility can be cost prohibitive, unless the facility is located close 
to the source of waste origin.72
Just over a year later, one of the hearing’s participants, Representative 
Chellie Pingree, a Democrat from Maine, whom Chairman Conaway 
credited for putting food waste on the Committee of Agriculture’s radar,73
made another big move. On July 27, 2017, Representative Pingree and 
Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat from Connecticut, introduced 
                                                                                                                         
68 E.g., Food Waste, supra note 67, at 47 (2016) (statements of Jesse M. Fink, Managing Director, 
MissionPoint Partners LLC, Norwalk, CT; on behalf of ReFED: Rethink Food Waste Through 
Economics and Data; and Meghan B. Stasz, Senior Director, Sustainability, Grocery Manufacturers 
Assoc., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Food Waste Reduction Alliance). 
Additionally, many testified in support of the standardization of date labels on food. E.g., id. at 7, 
18 (statements of Rep. Chellie Pingree; and Jesse M. Fink, Managing Director, MissionPoint Partners 
LLC, Norwalk, CT; on behalf of ReFED). There is widespread agreement that date labels, such as “sell 
by,” “use by,” and “best before,” confuse consumers, who may then dispose of food unnecessarily. 
While “sell by” dates are intended to communicate with grocers as “a tool for stock control,” “use by” 
and “best before” dates are more estimates of a product’s peak quality and not when a food will 
become unsafe. A report coauthored by the Natural Resources Defense Council and Harvard Law 
School’s Food Law and Policy Clinic found that “[m]ore than 90 percent of Americans may be 
prematurely tossing food because they misinterpret food labels as indicators of food safety.” New 
Report: Food Expiration Date Confusion Causing Up to 90% of Americans to Waste Food, Press 
Release, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.nrdc.org/media/2013/130918 
[https://perma.cc/MD7K-JC6P]. There are currently no national guidelines for dated food labels, with 
the exception of infant formula. Id. The diversion potential of standardizing date labeling is far less 
than anaerobic digestion, at roughly 400,000 tons annually. REFED, supra note 53, at 27, 48.
69 Food Waste, supra note 67, at 16 (statement of Dana Gunders, Senior Scientist, Food and 
Agriculture, Natural Resources Defense Council).
70 E.g., id.
71 Id. at 47 (statement of Meghan B. Stasz, Senior Director, Sustainability, Grocery Manufacturers 
Assoc., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Food Waste Reduction Alliance).
72 See id. (“[F]WRA’s [Food Waste Reduction Alliance] 2014 Assessment found that 70% of 
manufacturers, 92% of retailers, 83% of small restaurants and 100% of large restaurants surveyed listed 
‘insufficient recycling options’ as their number one barrier to diverting food waste from landfill.”); see 
also id. at 31 (statement from Jesse M. Fink, Managing Director, MissionPoint Partners LLC, Norwalk, 
CT; on behalf of ReFED: Rethink Food Waste Through Economics and Data) (testifying that (1) siting 
facilities near urban centers and optimizing hauling routes are important to ensure a facility’s steady 
flow of organic materials; and (2) building facilities in the Northeast, Northwest, and Midwest presents 
“the most [e]conomic [v]alue from recycling due to high landfill disposal fees and high compost and 
energy market prices”).
73 See id. at 2 (statement of Hon. K. Michael Conaway, Congressman from Texas) (“[I] commend 
my colleague from Maine, Chellie Pingree, for putting this on the Congressional radar.”).
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H.R. 3444, the Food Recovery Act of 2017. This landmark bicameral 
legislation calls for the reduction of food waste through measures that 
“ensure that more of our food is put to use rather than going to waste.”74 In 
addition to requiring actions like the standardization of date labeling and 
reducing waste in schools by encouraging cafeterias to purchase lower-cost 
“ugly” fruit and vegetables,75 the Food Recovery Act would amend the 
Consolidated Farm Rural Development Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1926(a)(1), in two 
significant ways. 
First, under the Food Recovery Act, the Consolidated Farm Rural 
Development Act would identify, for the first time, composting and 
anaerobic digestion as “essential community facilities.”76 This 
classification would fortify the United States’ commitment to food waste 
reduction by recognizing that these waste disposal methods are vital to our 
local communities. Second, under the Food Recovery Act, the 
Consolidated Farm Rural Development Act would require that 5 percent of 
the funds earmarked for essential community facility funding should be 
reserved for loans “for municipal or county composting, anaerobic 
digestion food waste-to-energy projects, and the conversion of animal 
waste products into industrial products or into raw materials . . . .”77 It also 
would make an additional $50 million available annually for loans.78 This 
unprecedented access to funding would go a long way toward making it 
easier for entities to surmount the financing hurdle that anaerobic digestion 
presents.
The passing of the Food Recovery Act would provide critical capital 
investment to solutions identified in the EPA’s Food Recovery Hierarchy. 
Unfortunately, the Food Recovery Act has not moved out of committee in
                                                                                                                         
74 Press Release, Congresswoman Chellie Pingree 1st District of Maine, Congresswoman Pingree 
Introduces Bicameral Food Recovery Act (July 31, 2017), https://pingree.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/congresswoman-pingree-intorduces-bicameral-food-recovery-act 
[https://perma.cc/2TB6-PKYT].
75 H.R. 3444, 115th Cong. §§ 401–406, 301–305.
76 H.R. 3444, 115th Cong. § 502 (2017). Consolidated Farm Rural Development Act, 7 U.S.C. § 
1926(a)(1), currently reads: 
The Secretary is also authorized to make or insure loans to associations . . . for the 
application or establishment of soil conservation practices, shifts in land use, the 
conservation, development, use, and control of water, and the installation or 
improvement of drainage or waste disposal facilities, recreational developments, and 
essential community facilities including necessary related equipment, all primarily 
serving farmers, ranchers, farm tenants, farm laborers, rural businesses, and other 
rural residents, and to furnish financial assistance or other aid in planning projects 
for such purposes.
77 H.R. 3444, 115th Cong. § 502 (2017) (emphasis added).
78 The $50 million would come from funds allocated to the government-owned Commodity Credit 
Corporation. Id.
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either the House or Senate.79 And despite Chairman Conaway’s claim that 
food waste is a bipartisan issue, so far Representative Pingree’s twenty-six
cosponsors in the House80 and Senator Blumenthal’s four cosponsors in the 
Senate are all Democrats.81 Until Congress passes legislation, it is up to 
individual states to ensure that food waste reduction actually happens.82
II. CONNECTICUT COMMITS TO FOOD WASTE DIVERSION
Well before the United States and the United Nations pledged to 
reduce food waste, Connecticut became the first state to pass legislation to 
reduce food waste through state-mandated diversion.83 Connecticut’s 
                                                                                                                         
79 All Actions Except Amendments H.R. 3444 — 115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3444/all-actions-without-amendments 
[https://perma.cc/78WG-7VVJ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018); All Actions Except Amendments H.R. 3444 
— 115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
house-bill/3444/all-actions-without-amendments [https://perma.cc/9HM9-KMMR] (last visited Jan. 31, 
2018).
80 Cosponsors: H.R. 3444 — 115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3444/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/Z4N2-
3LR8] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
81 Cosponsors: S. 1680 — 115th Congress (2017–18), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1680/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/363S-
BUVN] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
82 Only five states structure their laws as organic waste bans: California, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
42649.81 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (effective 2016); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e (West, Westlaw through the 2017 June Special Sess.) (effective 2014); 
Massachusetts, 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 19.017 (West, Westlaw through Reg. No. 1356, Jan. 12, 2018) 
(effective 2014); Rhode Island, 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18.9–17 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 480 of the 
Jan. 2017 Sess.) (effective 2016); and Vermont, VT. STA. ANN. tit. 10, § 6605k (West, Westlaw 
through the 2017 Legis. Sess.) (effective 2014). Four American cities also have city ordinances: New 
York City, New York (effective 2015); Portland, Oregon (effective 2014); San Francisco, California 
(effective 2009); and Seattle, Washington (effective 2015). U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF 
RES. CONSERVATION & RECOVERY, FOOD WASTE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014 9
(2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/food_waste_management_
2014_12082016_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZT9-HZAM]; see generally Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. 
Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 297 (2013) (arguing that the responsibility has 
fallen on the states to serve as the “‘laboratories’ for testing various policy mechanism in pursuit of 
protecting the environment”).
83 See CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT., 2016 COMPREHENSIVE MATERIALS 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY: THE CONNECTICUT SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN 9 (2016), 
[hereinafter THE PLAN], http://www.ct.gov/deep/lib/deep/waste_management_and_disposal/
Solid_Waste_Management_Plan/CMMS-Final_Adopted_Comprehensive_Materials_Management_
Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2JZ-XXQR] (citation omitted) (“Connecticut set the stage for 
expanding our processing capacity for food scraps and potential for reducing waste burned at the 
resources recovery facilities with a first-in-the-nation mandate for commercial organics recycling.”); 
Patrick Serfass, Vermont, Now Connecticut, Models for Diverting Organics, BIOMASS MAG. (July 1, 
2013), http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/9153/vermont-now-connecticut-models-for-diverting-
organics/ [https://perma.cc/H3FY-X6Q3] (“Connecticut got the ball rolling in October 2011 with the 
passage of Public Act 11–217, which required large commercial waste generators . . . to divert food 
waste if they were within 20 miles of a licensed facility.”); Nicholas M. Vaz, Comment, Are You 
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interest in food waste reduction stemmed from its realization that food 
waste was the largest component of its MSW.84 Today, Connecticut is one 
of five states that has passed either a waste ban or waste-recycling law for 
food waste that restricts entities that generate a specified amount of food 
waste from sending this waste to landfills, subject to certain exceptions.85
These laws are important examples of American federalism: the use of 
state-based experimentation to address a pressing national problem. 
This Part discusses the widespread belief in Connecticut that anaerobic 
digestion will rescue the state from its food waste problem by offering an 
environmentally conscious alternative to landfilling with the benefit of 
creating jobs and providing a renewable energy source.86 This Part further 
argues that Connecticut structured its organic materials recycling law,
Public Act 13-285, to guarantee that there would be product to support the 
state’s nascent anaerobic digestion industry.   
A. Legislation Creates Organics Recycling Market
In 2011, with the passage of Public Act 11-217, Connecticut did 
something that many hailed as “genius.”87 It required large commercial 
waste generators producing more than 104 tons of source-separated 
materials to divert that waste to a permitted source-separated organic-
material composting facility if they were within twenty miles of a licensed 
facility.88 Source-separated organics means “food waste or yard waste . . . 
that can be separated by the waste generator.”89 Connecticut’s requirement, 
though, only became effective six months after two licensed facilities 
could accept the material.90 This requirement is “what many hail as the 
law’s genius.”91 In essence, Connecticut was relying on the market to 
                                                                                                                         
Gonna Eat That?: A New Wave of Mandatory Recycling Has Massachusetts and Other New England 
States Paving the Way Toward Feasible Food Waste Diversion and a New Player in Alternative 
Energy, 26 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 193, 200 (2015) (arguing that Connecticut “paved the way for mandated 
diversion of food waste” with its passage of Public Act 11-217).
84 Brenda Platt, Connecticut—Organics Recycling Mandate, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE
(Apr. 15, 2016), https://ilsr.org/rule/food-scrap-ban/Connecticut-organics-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/
9Y9C-6QWT].
85 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF RES. CONSERVATION & RECOVERY, supra note 82.
86 See Jan Ellen Spiegel, Looks Like an Onion Skin, But It Could Be Electricity, CT MIRROR (Apr. 
30, 2012), https://ctmirror.org/2012/04/30/looks-onion-skin-it-could-be-electricity/ [https://perma.cc/
N4AG-DKSL] (“Connecticut views anaerobic digester technologies as drivers for green jobs and new 
industry, said Diane Duva, assistant director of waste engineering at DEEP.”).
87 Id.
88 2011 Conn. Acts 11-217 (Reg. Sess.).
89 See Serfass, supra note 83; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–207(30) (defining source-
separated organic material to “mean[] organic material, including, but not limited to, food scraps, food 
processing residue and soiled or unrecyclable paper that has been separated at the point or source of 
generation from nonorganic material”).
90 2011 Conn. Acts 11-217 (Reg. Sess.).
91 Spiegel, supra note 86.
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ensure the development of processing facilities for food waste, but once the 
facilities were built, the law guaranteed that there would be product to 
support them.92 In 2013, Connecticut slightly amended this law with the 
passage of Public Act 13-285, which maintained the 104-ton-per-year 
starting point for commercial generators and reduced this quota to 52 tons
per year in 2020.93
Public Act 13-285 supports Connecticut’s commitment to achieving 
60 percent diversion of solid waste from disposal by 2024.94 Connecticut 
has recognized that an increase in organic recycling requires that it have 
the infrastructure to handle this increase in processing.95 Specifically, 
DEEP has identified the development of anaerobic digestion facilities as 
one of the state’s “top growth priorities.”96 Connecticut also views its 
investment in anaerobic digester technologies as a “driver[] for green jobs 
and new industry.”97 Public Act 13-285, thus, was named aptly An Act 
Concerning Recycling and Jobs.98 Studies support Connecticut’s position 
that the handling of organics through recycling, as opposed to landfilling, 
creates job opportunities.99
With much on the line—addressing the state’s food waste problem, 
developing an organics recycling market, and creating green jobs—
Connecticut has supported the state’s development of anaerobic digestion 
facilities through the Connecticut Green Bank, the nation’s first green 
bank,100 infra Part II.B., and through the triggers in Public Act 13-285, an 
organic waste ban that functions as a flow control law that favors in-state 
businesses, infra Part II.C.
                                                                                                                         
92 See Serfass, supra note 83 (arguing in support of the sustainability of Connecticut’s model 
because it creates a market by “ensur[ing] that if a developer builds a system nearby, they’ll have 
organic waste to feed it”). But see, John Turner, The Flow Control of Solid Waste and the Commerce 
Clause: Carbone and Its Progeny, 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 208 (1996) (“Flow control measures often 
result in a significant ‘takings’ issue, if not in the constitutional sense, at least from the standpoint of 
fairness. . . . When one jurisdiction establishes flow control, other facilities immediately have current 
and potential customer assets pulled away.”).
93 2013 Conn. Acts 13-285 § 4(a)(2) (Reg. Sess.). The law exempts “[a]ny wholesaler, distributer, 
manufacturer, processor, supermarket, resort or conference center that performs composting of source-
separated organic materials on site or treats source-separated organic materials via on-site organic 
treatment equipment . . . .” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e(b) (2017).
94 THE PLAN, supra note 83, at 7.
95 Id. at 19.
96 Id.
97 Spiegel, supra note 86.
98 2013 Conn. Acts 13-285 (Reg. Sess.).
99 Spiegel, supra note 86; see, e.g., REFED, supra note 4, at 56 (“For every million tons of 
organic matter composted, nearly 1,400 new jobs can be sustained using the finished compost in green 
infrastructure.” (citation omitted)).
100 About Us: Changing Connecticut for the Greener, CONN. GREEN BANK,
http://www.ctgreenbank.com/about-us-2017/ [https://perma.cc/RP9L-JE3Q] (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
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B. The Connecticut Green Bank Provides Funding 
In 2011, to promote the development of an anaerobic digestion 
industry in Connecticut, Connecticut created the Clean Energy Finance and 
Investment Authority (CEFIA) under Public Act 11-80.101 CEFIA would 
eventually be given a broader mandate and become the Connecticut Green 
Bank.102 The Connecticut Green Bank—the nation’s first green bank—is a 
quasi-public company that leverages “limited public dollars to attract 
private capital investment in clean energy projects.”103 Since its inception, 
Connecticut Green Bank has invested more than $1 billion in the state’s 
clean energy.104
Public Act 11-80, Section 103(b) empowered CEFIA to “establish a 
three-year pilot program to support through loans, grants or power 
purchase agreements sustainable practices and economic prosperity of 
Connecticut farms and other businesses by using organic waste with on-
site anaerobic digestion facilities to generate electricity and heat.”105
Furthermore, CEFIA was authorized to allocate $2 million annually for 
anaerobic digestion projects106 for no more than five projects.107 In 2012, 
this pilot program was extended to five years, ending in 2017.108 Quantum 
Biopower, Connecticut’s first anaerobic digestion facility in Southington, 
for example, received a $2 million lower-interest loan from Connecticut 
Green Bank for its $14 million project.109
Notably, Public Act 11-80 also created the Connecticut DEEP by 
consolidating the Department of Environmental Protection and Department 
of Public Utility Control.110 Connecticut’s creation of DEEP reflects the 
State’s position that the preservation of its natural resources is inextricably 
intertwined with its energy usage and production. The relative newness of 
DEEP, however, has resulted in a slow permit process for anaerobic 
                                                                                                                         
101 2011 Conn. Acts 11-80, § 103, 211–12.
102 About Us: Changing Connecticut for the Greener, supra note 100.
103 Id. 
104 Since its inception, “for every $1 of public funds committed by the Green Bank . . . an 
additional $6 in private investment occurred in the economy.” Id.; see also CONN. GREEN BANK,
ANNUAL REPORT 2016: BUILDING A STRONGER CONNECTICUT 5 (2016), 
http://www.ctgreenbank.com/fy16-annual-report/ [https://perma.cc/PV3V-S93Q] (detailing how, in 
2016, the Connecticut Green Bank’s public-private partnerships in clean energy projects and programs 
created an additional 4,444 jobs).
105 2011 Conn. Acts 11-80, § 103(b), 212 (Reg. Sess.).
106 Id. at § 103(d), 212.
107 Id.
108 2015 Conn. Acts 15-152 2 (Reg. Sess.)
109 Quantum Biopower Unveils Connecticut’s First Food-Waste-to-Energy Facility, QUANTUM 
BIOPOWER, http://www.quantumbiopower.com/about-us-2/news/quantum-biopower-unveils-
connecticuts-first-food-waste-energy-facility/ [https://perma.cc/FGM3-H6KA] (last visited Jan. 10, 
2018).
110 2011 Conn. Acts 11-80 1 (Reg. Sess.)
836 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:3
digestion facilities.111 DEEP has been working to address the regulatory 
factors that have burdened or discouraged the development of anaerobic 
digestion.112
C. Organics Recycling Mandate Favors Local Businesses
In addition to making financing available through the Connecticut 
Green Bank, Connecticut supports anaerobic digestion through Public Act 
13-285, a flow-control law governing the recycling of organic materials.113
This law favors in-state businesses in three primary ways. 
1. Permit Requirement
Waste generators are permitted to recycle organic materials only “at 
any authorized source-separated organic-material composting facility.”114
A “composting facility” is a facility that uses either composting or 
anaerobic digestion to process organic materials.115 Connecticut mandates 
that composting facilities receiving Connecticut’s organic waste must 
obtain permits administered by DEEP’s Bureau of Materials Management 
and Compliance Assurance.116 This means that facilities receiving 
Connecticut’s waste must be located in Connecticut.
Theoretically, DEEP says that a Connecticut entity could transport its 
organic materials to an out-of-state facility, contingent on the facility 
meeting basic compliance standards, as determined by DEEP.117 Organic 
materials are dense and heavy, so the cost of transporting this waste to a 
facility farther than the local Connecticut-based facility would be 
expensive, making it unlikely that an entity would use an out-of-state 
facility unless that facility were the closer of the two facilities.118
                                                                                                                         
111 See, e.g., Jan Ellen Spiegel, Recycling Food Waste in Connecticut: Slow as Molasses, CT 
MIRROR (Apr. 11, 2016), https://ctmirror.org/2016/04/11/recycling-food-waste-in-connecticut-slow-as-
molasses/ [https://perma.cc/Y2UP-MHPM] (reporting how Quantum Biopower submitted its permits 
for approval in late 2013, and in April 2016, twenty-six months later, it was still waiting to receive 
permitting).
112 THE PLAN, supra note 83, at 52–53.
113 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e (codifying Public Act 13-285).
114 Id. § (a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
115 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-207(29) (2017) (defining “composting facility” as that which 
“us[es] a process of accelerated biological decomposition of organic material under controlled aerobic 
or anaerobic conditions”).
116 Solid Waste Facility: An Environmental Permitting Fact Sheet, CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY &
ENVTL. PROT., http://www.ct.gov/deep/cwp/view.asp?a=2709&q=324200&deepNav_GID=1643 
[https://perma.cc/9U3T-F42N] (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
117 Telephone Interview with Sherill Baldwin, Environmental Analyst, Conn. Dep’t of Energy & 
Envtl. Prot. (Jan. 8, 2018). 
118 Id.
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2. Proximity Trigger
Connecticut creates a proximity trigger to the mandate by requiring 
disposal for waste generators that meet a tonnage threshold and are located 
not more than twenty miles from an authorized facility.119 In conjunction 
with the permit requirement, this restriction effectively requires that 
facilities competing in Connecticut’s market must be located in 
Connecticut.120 Otherwise, a facility’s out-of-state location may fail to 
trigger the law’s geographic and tonnage requirements for Connecticut 
entities. This places in-state anaerobic digestion facilities at a competitive 
advantage because only their proximity to a business generating the 
tonnage quota can trigger the mandate. Furthermore, as discussed supra
Section C.1, transporting organic materials can be cost prohibitive. This 
cost would deter an entity from transporting its waste anywhere except the 
state-authorized facility located not more than twenty miles away. 
Effectively, therefore, the law requires that entities that fall within the law 
send their organic materials to the facilities that Connecticut authorizes.
3. Tonnage Trigger
Public Act 13-285 guarantees waste flow to authorized facilities 
through its waste tonnage requirements for commercial generators.121 Any 
commercial food wholesaler or distributer, industrial food manufacturer or 
processor, supermarket, resort, or conference center that produces 104 tons 
of organic materials each year, or 52 tons per year as of 2020, triggers this 
tonnage requirement.122 If a commercial generator triggers the tonnage 
requirement and is within twenty miles of an authorized source-separated 
composting facility, then it must recycle its organic materials at an 
authorized facility—that is, a facility located in Connecticut.123 This 
tonnage trigger hoards all organic materials from these businesses for those 
facilities that Connecticut authorizes, thereby ensuring that there is product 
to sustain those facilities.
                                                                                                                         
119 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-226e(a)(1)–(2) (2017).
120 Currently, Connecticut has one operational anaerobic digestion facility, Quantum Biopower; 
two facilities under construction; and one planned for construction. Central locations, such as the two 
anaerobic digestion facilities in Southington, Connecticut, and sites near cities, like the permitted 
facilities in Bridgeport and North Haven, appear most desirable for client acquisition. See Food Waste 
Composting Facilities, CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT.,
http://www.ct.gov/deep/cwp/view.asp?a=2718&q=325376&deepNav_GID=1645 [https://perma.cc/
MH2V-HJJW] (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (identifying the permitted composting and anaerobic 
digestion facilities in Connecticut). 
121 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-226e(a)(1)–(2) (2017).
122 Id.
123 See Food Waste Composting Facilities, supra note 120 (identifying the permitted composting 
and anaerobic digestion facilities in Connecticut).
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Much of central and eastern Connecticut remains exempt from the 
requirements of Connecticut’s organic waste ban because there are no
approved facilities in those areas.124 Thus, the law cannot hoard the organic 
materials in these areas. That said, given the amount of organic materials in 
Connecticut’s MSW, these regions are likely landfilling their organic 
materials.
In these three ways—the permit requirement, the proximity trigger,
and tonnage trigger—Connecticut’s organic waste ban promotes the 
recycling of organic materials by ensuring that in-state, and not out-of-
state, facilities are receiving Connecticut’s organic materials. Connecticut 
Green Bank also has promoted its composting facilities by making millions 
of dollars in loans available to investors. But in promoting a homegrown 
organics recycling market, Connecticut may have run afoul of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.125
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: STATES SINK OR SWIM
TOGETHER
In the United States Constitution, the Commerce Clause provides that 
“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”126
The United States Supreme Court has “long interpreted the Commerce 
Clause as an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a 
conflicting federal statute.”127 This implicit restraint is referred to as the 
“dormant” aspect of the Commerce Clause.128 The Dormant Commerce 
Clause protects the belief that “one state in its dealings with another may 
not place itself in a position of economic isolation.”129 Instead, the Court 
has held that the Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples 
of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run 
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”130 This idea of 
economic, national unity animates the Dormant Commerce Clause.131
                                                                                                                         
124 Id.
125 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (holding that a 
flow control ordinance, which requires all solid waste to be processed at a designated transfer station 
before leaving the municipality, “is just one more instance of local processing requirements that we 
long have held invalid”).
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
127 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 
(2007).
128 Id.
129 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
130 Id. at 523.
131 See, e.g., id. at 527–28 (holding that New York’s Milk Control Act, which prohibited the sale 
of milk imported from another state unless it was sold at a set price, was a direct and unconstitutional 
burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause).
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As Part I discusses, when it comes to food waste, the federal 
government, by and large, has left the states to swim alone in unchartered 
waters.132 There are, though, two United States Supreme Court cases that 
deal specifically with the legality of flow control: C & A Carbone, Inc. v. 
Town of Clarkstown133 and United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority.134 This Part first considers 
these two cases and, then, suggests that Connecticut’s Public Act 13-285
looks similar to the ordinance that the Court struck down in Carbone as 
violating the Dormant Commerce Clause. Despite this similarity, in the 
face of Congress’ inaction in regards to food waste reduction, this Part 
argues that there should be deference to state experimentation on this issue 
given the important role states play as innovators and protectors of the 
environment. In its final Section, this Part provides solutions for how to 
save Connecticut’s organic waste ban from running afoul of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.
A. Supreme Court Invalidates Local Flow Ordinance
In 1994, in Carbone, the Court invalidated a local flow ordinance on 
the grounds that it was facially discriminatory under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.135 The town of Clarkstown, New York had agreed to 
close its landfill and a local private contractor had agreed to construct a 
private recycling facility, which would revert to municipal ownership after 
five years.136 Until that happened, though, the town: (1) guaranteed a 
minimum waste flow of 120,000 tons to amortize the costs of the private 
facility; and (2) made noncompliance punishable by fine and 
imprisonment.137
The Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause analysis considered two 
questions. 138 First, did the flow control ordinance discriminate against 
interstate commerce? 139 Second, was the burden on interstate commerce 
“clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits”?140
                                                                                                                         
132 See Sam Kalen, Dormancy Versus Innovation: A Next Generation Dormant Commerce Clause,
65 OKLA. L. REV. 381, 425–26 (2013) (arguing that state and local communities are exploring 
innovative solutions to society’s modern challenges alone, which will test the contours of the current 
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
133 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
134 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007).
135 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392.
136 Id. at 387.
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 390.
139 Id.
140 Id. The Court’s two-tiered analysis applied the analytical framework of the Court’s decision in 
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), where the Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a New Jersey ban on the importation of waste from other states. Id. 
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The first tier of inquiry, the per se invalid test, subjects a facially 
discriminatory regulation to a strict and nondeferential standard of 
review.141 A court will apply per se invalid analysis to three different types 
of discrimination: (1) where a law facially discriminates by treating 
differently in-state and out-of-state economic interests to the economic 
advantage of the former; (2) where a facially neutral law was enacted for 
the purpose of economic protectionism; and (3) where “a facially neutral 
law has obvious discriminatory effects.”142 If a statute passes the per se
invalid analysis, then a court may still find a constitutional violation under 
the second tier of inquiry—known as the Pike balancing test—which 
inquires whether the “burden [imposed] on interstate commerce . . . is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”143
The Carbone Court concluded that the town’s flow control ordinance 
hoarded a local resource by preventing local businesses from sending 
already sorted recyclables directly out-of-state for processing, even though 
the law equally discriminated against out-of-town and in-state 
processors.144 The ordinance, therefore, affected interstate commerce by 
prohibiting out-of-state competition and by driving up the costs for out-of-
state interests to dispose of their waste.145 It did not matter that there was 
no evidence that out-of-state “firms were economically disadvantaged 
compared to in-state firms.”146 It also did not matter that the town cited 
both environmental protection and financing measures as legitimate 
reasons for its ordinance.147 Because the town had alternative, 
nondiscriminatory ways to address its health and environmental problems,
such as enacting safety regulations, the Court found a violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause and never reached the excessive-burden 
inquiry.148
The ordinance’s “purpose to distort competition [was] objectionable 
precisely because the effect—distortion of competition—is constitutionally 
                                                                                                                         
141 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624 (“Thus, where simple economic protectionism is 
effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”).
142 Bradford C. Mank, Are Public Facilities Different from Private Ones?: Adopting a New 
Standard of Review for the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 SMU L. REV. 157, 163–64 (2007).
143 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)); see also Anthony L. Moffa & Stephanie L. Safdi, Freedom from the 
Costs of Trade: A Principled Argument Against Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny of Goods 
Movement Policies, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 344, 363 (2014) (“In practice, this balancing test has 
proved unworkable, as the Supreme Court has effectively collapsed both tests into a single screen that 
roots out ‘protectionist’ legislation.”).
144 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390–91 (“With respect to this stream of commerce, the flow control 
ordinance discriminates, for it allows only the favored operator to process waste that is within the limits 
of the town.”).
145 Id. at 389.
146 Mank, supra note 142, at 176 (citation omitted).
147 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.
148 Id. at 386, 393.
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proscribed.”149 This kind of local economic protectionism “is per se
invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in which the municipality can 
demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance 
a legitimate local interest.”150 Under Carbone, a state carries a heavy
burden of proving that its statutory scheme effectuates a legitimate public 
interest, particularly because a mere environmental objective on the 
grounds of protectionism will not satisfy this requirement.151
The Carbone Court’s prohibition of a town’s local flow control 
ordinance reflects a “growth of the [D]ormant [C]ommerce [C]lause” to 
extend to environmental and waste disposal practices.152 With this growth, 
there has been “a concomitant contraction of the states’ ability to regulate 
within the sphere of interstate commercial activity.”153 The Court’s 
imposition of “a virtually per se rule of invalidity”154 places state and local 
regulations aimed at environmental protection in a vulnerable position, 
leading some scholars to argue that “laudable environmental motives or 
achievements [could] become irrelevant.”155
B. Publicly Owned Waste Facilities May Favor Local Government
Over a decade later, in United Haulers, the Court narrowed its holding 
in Carbone by determining for the first time that public and private entities 
should not be regarded “with equal skepticism.”156 United Haulers was 
another flow control ordinance case with one salient difference: the laws at 
                                                                                                                         
149 Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. U. L. REV. 255, 287 
(2017); see also Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate 
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 580 (1997) (“The 
intentional, self-serving nature of a typical protectionist measure is likely to invoke anxiety in other 
states and invite hostile, retaliatory measures. In evaluating a state statute for protectionism, the focus 
ought to be on whether the state enacted the statute because it intended to isolate itself and/or protect a 
segment of its industry from competition on the interstate market.” (internal citation omitted)).
150 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392 (citation omitted).
151 C.M.A. McCauliff, The Environment Held in Trust for Future Generations or the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Held Hostage to the Invisible Hand of the Market?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 645, 662 
(1995).
152 Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 48–49
(2003).
153 Id. at 48.
154 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 422 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted).
155 Klein, supra note 152, at 49 (citation omitted); see, e.g., McCauliff, supra note 151, at 683–84 
(stating that “the public interest is damaged by too aggressive an extension of the dormant Commerce 
Clause”); Andrew D. Thompson, Note, Public Health, Environmental Protection, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: Maintaining State Sovereignty in the Federalist Structure, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 213, 216 (2004) (“In its resolve to expose the underlying intent of resource protectionism, 
however, the Court has espoused a standard that has been interpreted to invalidate state environmental 
laws that pertain significantly to public health.”).
156 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343 
(2007).
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issue required haulers to bring waste to facilities owned and operated by a 
state-created public benefit corporation, effectively excluding all other 
businesses, foreign and domestic, for competing for the counties’ 
business.157 For a plurality of the Court, this difference was determinative. 
While laws favoring “in-state business over out-of-state competition” 
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, “[l]aws favoring local 
government, by contrast, may be directed toward any number of legitimate 
goals unrelated to [economic] protectionism.”158 Thus, where waste 
regulation is a local government function involving public entities, “[t]he 
[D]ormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license” for judicial oversight 
and review.159 Instead, democratic processes provide “citizens and 
businesses . . . [that] bear the costs of the ordinances” sufficient protection 
against discrimination and the more lenient Pike balancing test should be 
applied.160 Any incidental burden on interstate commerce that does not 
outweigh the benefits conferred by the regulation will likely withstand 
scrutiny.161
The Court determined that the waste flow ordinances served sufficient 
public benefit by financing the waste disposal services, “increas[ing] 
recycling . . . [and] conferring significant health and environmental 
benefits upon the citizens of the Counties.”162 The Court further 
determined that if the haulers could take waste to any disposal site—and 
not the site proscribed under the ordinances—recycling “enforcement 
would be much more costly, if not impossible.”163
The Court’s decision in United Haulers, according to Justice Clarence 
Thomas, underscores the problem with the Dormant Commerce Clause: it 
“has proven unworkable in practice.”164 It has become a vehicle for judicial 
activism and, therefore, vulnerable to the Court’s shifting policy 
preferences.165 Justice Thomas argued that it is not the Court’s purview to 
express, as it does in United Haulers, what can only be “a policy-driven 
                                                                                                                         
157 Id. at 334.
158 Id. at 343.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 345–46 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
161 Id. at 334.
162 Id. at 346–47.
163 Id. at 347.
164 Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring).
165 Id. at 351; see Laura Gabrysch, Note, Constitutional Law—Dormant Commerce Clause—Flow 
Control Ordinances That Require Disposal of Trash at a Designated Facility Violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 563, 592 (1995) (“[T]he Carbone decision indicates the Court’s 
willingness to make policy judgments which should fall under the domain of the legislature and not that 
of the judiciary. The tests used for both levels of Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny allow the 
Supreme Court to pit local public concerns against private economic interests. . . . [T]his type of use of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause invites those with money and power to attack environmental 
regulations by bypassing the legislative process and going straight to the judiciary.” (citations 
omitted)).
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preference for government monopoly over privatization.”166 Instead of 
being left to the whim of the courts, state and local environmental 
regulations should be debated through the legislative process.167
Where there is congressional silence, Justice Thomas is right—states 
should be “free to set the balance between protectionism and the free 
market.”168 That balance weighs, on the one hand, state sovereignty over 
issues involving the environment, health, and safety and, on the other hand, 
strong economic national unity that encourages market entry.169 The 
Dormant Commerce Clause fails to account for the necessary role states 
and localities play in this balancing process as it concerns environmental 
regulations.170 A Dormant Commerce Clause that is too aggressively 
enforced could stymie “governments’ ability to plan and provide for the 
most environmentally sound and economically acceptable solutions”171—
solutions like Connecticut Public Act 13-285.
                                                                                                                         
166 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc., 550 U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., concurring).
167 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the dangers of “leav[ing] the future of state and local 
regulation of commerce to the whim of the Federal Judiciary”).
168 Id. at 352.
169 See McCauliff, supra note 151, at 661 (“The Supreme Court’s new concern with 
discrimination against interstate commerce by local protectionism emphasizes the role of the market by 
encouraging market entry, and consequently, de-emphasizes public interest, governmental functions 
and health and safety regulations.” (citation omitted)).
170 One example of how the Dormant Commerce Clause fails to account for the importance of 
states’ roles as laboratories of experiment is with the contemporary goods movement, the long-range 
transportation of agricultural goods. Long-range transportation results in negative externalities, such as 
greenhouse gas emissions, that uniquely impact local communities. A policy that “provides explicit 
benefits exclusively to local producers [as a means to reduce the effect of greenhouse gas emissions] is 
particularly vulnerable to Dormant Commerce Clause challenge based on imputed protectionist intent.” 
Moffa & Safdi, supra note 143, at 397. If the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Corey is any indication, “local and global externalities . . . necessitate[] a fundamental 
rethinking of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” Id. at 351. In that case, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard, a program designed to address the negative 
externalities of the goods movement by assigning carbon intensity scores that treated in-state and out-
of-state fuels differently based not on the fuel’s origin but its carbon intensity, was not an 
extraterritorial regulation in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. See Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (“California’s regulatory experiment seeking to 
decrease GHG emissions and create a market that recognizes the harmful costs of products with a high 
carbon intensity does not facially discriminate against out-of-state ethanol.”), reh’g en banc denied,
740 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 134 S.Ct. 2875 (2014). Such a rethinking is necessary 
because the “Dormant Commerce Clause evisceration of local and state regulations can add to the 
disempowerment of communities most affected by goods movement by further removing them from 
decision-making processes.” Moffa & Safdi, supra note 143, at 404.
171 Eric S. Petersen & David N. Abramowitz, Municipal Solid Waste Flow Control in the 
Post-Carbone World, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 416 (1995); see also Kalen, supra note 132, at 402, 
425 (arguing that the Dormant Commerce Clause has “stymied state and local efforts to respond to 
emerging problems” as conservative organizations challenge state and local statutes designed to protect 
against climate change and that “it is reasonably likely,” therefore, “that the [Dormant Commerce 
Clause] will function either as a potential obstacle or a chilling effect on laudable efforts”); Moffa & 
Safdi, supra note 143, at 406 (“[I]t is the authors’ hope that Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
will eventually fall by the historical wayside. The principles of cooperative federalism and 
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C. Public Act 13-285 May Run Afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Connecticut Public Act 13-285 likely would fail the first tier of the 
Carbone Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, which considers
whether a flow control ordinance is per se invalid because it discriminates 
against interstate commerce.172 If Public Act 13-285 were to survive strict 
scrutiny analysis, however, it has a good chance of passing the Pike
balancing test, the Carbone Court’s second tier of analysis.173 Connecticut 
could also amend its law to avoid any constitutional challenges.
1. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
When framed as a law that ensures that Connecticut’s composting 
facilities have enough organic materials product to support them, Public 
Act 13-285 likely provides for the kind of local economic protectionism 
that is per se invalid.174 This is because Connecticut’s organic materials
waste ban looks similar to the ordinance struck down in Carbone in that it 
requires certain local entities to bring a local resource to a state-mandated 
processing facility.175 That the ordinance in Carbone favored only one 
local facility, whereas Public Act 13-285 applies to multiple facilities, does 
not matter because this fact in Carbone was not determinative; it just made 
the ordinance’s protectionist effect all the more acute.176 Moreover, under 
Carbone, as long as the law espouses protectionist intent to discriminate 
against interstate commerce, there does not necessarily need to be evidence 
supporting actual discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.177
Connecticut could make two arguments in its defense. First, 
Connecticut could claim that Public Act 13-285 “serves a legitimate local 
purpose that could not be served as well by nondiscriminatory means.”178
But “[t]his last-ditch opportunity is largely illusory” with one exception: 
Maine v. Taylor.179 In Taylor, the Court upheld the State of Maine’s ban on 
                                                                                                                         
environmental justice both suggest that the time has come for the courts to abandon Dormant 
Commerce Clause review entirely.”).
172 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (offering a 
two-tiered analysis for Dormant Commerce Clause cases). 
173 See id.
174 See id. at 392 (discussing how discrimination against interstate commerce in a way that aims to 
protect local businesses is “per se invalid” in all cases except where a municipality can demonstrate 
that it has “no other means to advance a legitimate local interest”).
175 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e (2013).
176 See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392 (noting that the fact that the town’s ordinance only favored one 
local processing facility only “makes the protectionist effect of the ordinance more acute”).
177 See Mank, supra note 142, at 178 (“The Carbone majority invalidated the flow control 
ordinance because it interfered with free access to waste markets, although there was no evidence of 
discrimination between in-state and out-of-state firms . . . .”).
178 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 356 
(2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).
179 O’Grady, supra note 149, at 574 n.12.
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the importation of baitfish, as Maine had no other means of preventing a 
spread of parasites and an adulteration of its native fish populations.180 The 
Court held that Maine was not expected “to sit idly by and wait until 
potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred or until the 
scientific community agrees on what disease organisms are or are not 
dangerous before it acts to avoid such consequences.”181
Under Taylor, Connecticut would have to identify a specific threat to 
the state’s health and safety or to the integrity of its natural resources.182 If 
Connecticut were to identify, say, climate change as its threat, analogizing 
to Taylor’s tangible threats of parasites and adulteration would be difficult.
The causal relationship between mandating food waste diversion and,
thereby, reducing climate change is far more attenuated than banning the 
importation of baitfish and, thereby, eliminating the threat of parasites and
adulteration on native fish populations. Furthermore, to address climate 
change, there are a number of alternative, nondiscriminatory means that 
Connecticut could implement, such as carbon offset programs or 
encouraging more people to bike or carpool to work.183 Therefore, while 
Connecticut also should not have to sit idly by and wait until irreversible 
environmental damage has occurred because of the high amount of food 
waste in its MSW, Connecticut’s law likely would not withstand strict 
scrutiny.
Second, Connecticut could distinguish Public Act 13-285 from 
Carbone by arguing that its law is not facially discriminatory because out-
of-state composting facilities can receive Connecticut’s organic materials
since in-state waste generators can send their waste to “any authorized
source-separated organic material composting facility.”184 This argument 
could save Public Act 13-285 from being per se invalid. The law’s 
twenty-mile proximity trigger, however, may make this distinction 
irrelevant. Even if the law authorizes any in-state or out-of-state facility to 
receive the state’s organic material, only Connecticut-based facilities can 
activate the twenty-mile proximity trigger. And this proximity trigger 
effectively discriminates against out-of-state facilities because 
                                                                                                                         
180 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 141, 151 (1986).
181 Id. at 148 (citation omitted).
182 See id. at 151 (“As long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to 
‘place itself in a position of economic isolation,’ . . .  it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the 
health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources.” (citation omitted)).
183 An analysis of Connecticut’s Public Act 13-285 under Taylor using the threat of hunger 
similarly fails given that there are a number of alternative ways to combat hunger other than through 
the state’s organic materials waste ban.
184 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e(a)(1)(B) (2017) (emphasis added).
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transportation costs of organic materials are cost prohibitive beyond a 
certain distance.185
2. Pike Balancing Test
If Public Act 13-285 were to survive strict scrutiny analysis, then, the 
question becomes whether it would pass a Pike balancing test. Under this 
test, Public Act 13-285 is constitutional if its incidental impact on interstate 
commerce is not “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”186 Connecticut could persuasively argue that the law benefits its
communities by (1) providing the organic materials necessary to sustain 
the state’s anaerobic digestion facilities; (2) increasing organic materials 
recycling and, thereby, reducing food waste in the state’s MSW; and (3)
conferring significant health and environmental benefits to its citizens. As 
evidence does not exist that the law actually burdens interstate commerce, 
these local, putative benefits would tip the scale in favor of finding Public 
Act 13-285 constitutionally valid. 
3. Amending Public Act 13-285
While no party has yet to challenge the constitutionality of Public Act 
13-285,187 Connecticut could amend its law so that it no longer 
discriminates against interstate commerce. 
First, albeit an unlikely solution, Connecticut could make its permitted 
composting facilities public entities, which would subject them to the more 
lenient Pike balancing test under United Haulers.188 Given “local 
government’s vital role in waste management,” public facilities would pass 
constitutional muster.189
                                                                                                                         
185 See Part II.C.2 (explaining that Connecticut’s requirement that disposal for waste generators 
meet a tonnage threshold and be located not more than twenty miles from an authorized facility creates 
a proximity trigger and impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce).
186 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
187 Challenging recycling laws might be a bad business move; whereas, studies support that using 
green initiatives as a marketing tool is good for business. See, e.g., Dholakiya Pratik, Earth Day 
Aspirations: Saving Money While Saving the Environment, BUSINESS.COM (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.business.com/articles/earth-day-aspirations-saving-money-while-saving-the-environment/ 
[https://perma.cc/4KU6-A8S6] (“A Nielson study of consumer attitudes across 60 countries found that 
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Second, Connecticut could remove the authorization requirement 
under the act, thereby, allowing any eligible composting facility in-state or 
out-of-state to participate in its market. The downside here is that 
Connecticut’s nascent anaerobic digestion facilities may suffer and 
Connecticut needs these facilities to meet its 60 percent diversion goal.190
Additionally, the authorization requirement serves an important oversight 
function of ensuring that the facilities receiving Connecticut’s organic 
materials are efficient and capable. Under this solution, the proximity 
trigger may still prove problematic for the reasons discussed above. 
Finally, Connecticut could remove the proximity trigger altogether. 
The problem, though, with this solution is whether, without the proximity 
trigger, the law still would achieve its desired goals of removing food 
waste from Connecticut’s MSW while also supporting the state’s anaerobic 
digestion market by ensuring that the state’s anaerobic digestion facilities
receive enough product to be financially viable. 
CONCLUSION
Food waste contributes to global warming by depleting the nation’s 
natural resources and by producing toxic methane gas. In this way, food 
waste is undeniably a national problem, but it is also a state and local 
problem in need of immediate solutions. Connecticut Public Act 13-285 
offers an environmentally sound, innovative solution to Connecticut’s food 
waste problem. It is not a solution that will eliminate Connecticut’s food 
waste—as the state should implement a more comprehensive organic waste 
ban that reaches individual consumers as well as industrial generators—but 
it is a start. 
Connecticut’s organic waste ban should be heralded as innovative and 
necessary; it reduces food waste and harmful methane gas emissions, 
promotes Connecticut’s anaerobic digestion industry, and creates green 
energy and new job opportunities. Instead, it may be vulnerable to 
challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which has the power to 
impede critical state and local regulations aimed at environmental 
protection—regulations like Connecticut Public Act 13-285. But a rigid 
application of the Dormant Commerce Clause that does not show 
deference to state experimentation on the issue of food waste reduction 
fails to account for the important role states and localities play as
“innovators and guardians of public health and the environment.”191
                                                                                                                         
190 THE PLAN, supra note 83, at 7, 19.
191 Moffa & Safdi, supra note 143, at 401.

